

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FEBRUARY 28, 1958

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FROM:

BONN (RA)

Info

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 2704 FEBRUARY 28 7 PM

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
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SENT DEPARTMENT 2704, REPEATED INFORMATION ROME 66, LONDON 305, PARIS 463.

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REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 2167 TO BONN, 3022 TO PARIS, 3172 TO ROME, 5868 TO LONDON.

1. IN LONG RUN CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS LIKELY IMPEL FEDREP DESIRE INDEPENDENT STOCKPILE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; E.G. BRITISH AND ANTICIPATED FRENCH ACQUISITION, DOUBTS ABOUT U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON CONTINENT, UNCERTAINTY OF U.S. REACTION TO LOCAL ATTACKS, INCREASING DESIRE FOR MORE INDEPENDENCE OF U.S., FEELING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NECESSARY ATTRIBUTES OF MODERN SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON FEDREP THINKING IF DISARMAMENT STALEMATE CONTINUES, ETC.

2. AT PRESENT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO POPULAR DRIVE IN WEST GERMANY FOR STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDEPENDENT OF U.S. SUPPLY AND CONTROL. EVEN WITHIN GOVERNMENT, SUCH DESIRE AS MAY EXIST IS CENTERED IN HANDFUL OF MEN HEADED BY STRAUSS. ON CONTRARY, STRONG POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS MILITATE AGAINST ANY SUCH ISSUE NOW BEING RAISED PUBLICLY.

3. WE DOUBT THAT CHANCELLOR AWARE EXTENT STRAUSS CONVERSATIONS AND POSSIBLY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. ON BASIS ESTIMATE HIS CHARACTER AND POLITICAL OUTLOOK, WE BELIEVE IF THERE WERE STRONG AMERICAN OBJECTIONS, HE MIGHT ACCEDE TO OUR VIEWS

REGARDING

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-2- 2704, FEBRUARY 28, 7 PM, FROM BONN

REGARDING UNDESIRABILITY GERMANY ACCELERATING PROGRAM FOURTH  
COUNTRY-NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION.

4. BELIEVE APPROACH TO CHANCELLOR, AFTER STRAUSS VISIT AND  
REPORT THEREON FROM WASHINGTON, MIGHT BE USEFUL. OUR CONTINUED  
SILENCE IN THIS MATTER MAY BE TAKEN FOR CONSENT. ALSO WE ARE  
TROUBLED BY SECRECY AND OBSCURITY SURROUNDING FIG AGREEMENT  
AND GERMAN PLANS IN THIS FIELD.

5. I PROPOSE THAT INSTEAD OF MAKING A FORMAL DEMARCHE TO THE  
GERMAN GOVERNMENT, I TALK TO THE CHANCELLOR AND BE AUTHORIZED  
IN THE COURSE OF A TOUR D'HORIZON TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT HIS  
POLICIES IN REGARD TO ANY NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AGREEMENT,  
ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL, WITH THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS. IN THE LIGHT  
OF HIS OBSERVATIONS AND WHATEVER MAY BE LEARNED FROM STRAUSS  
IN WASHINGTON WE CAN THEN DECIDE WHETHER TO ENGAGE IN  
FURTHER OR MORE FORMAL CONVERSATIONS.

6. ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR SHOULD BE  
HELD SOON AFTER HIS RETURN FROM BONN MARCH 6, I REITERATE  
SUGGESTION MY 2409 FEBRUARY 5 THAT BEFORE DOING SO IT WOULD  
BE HELPFUL IF AMBASSADORS CONCERNED COULD MEET TO EXCHANGE  
VIEWS AND CONCERT TACTICS. OTHERWISE LEAKS AND CONSEQUENT  
EMBARRASSMENT ALMOST INEVITABLE.

7. WILL COMMENT ON PART 4 DEPTTEL 2167 IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

BRUCE

HC/22

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